

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 182728
ORIGIN IO-14

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02
SS-15 USIA-06 DHA-02 ACDA-07 AF-10 ARA-10 EA-07
EUR-12 TRSE-00 OMB-01 AID-05 EB-08 OES-07 ERDA-05
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CONFIDENTIAL STATE 182728

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SUBJECT: PRE 32ND UNGA CONSULTATIONS (MAYNES MEMCON)
(MAYNES MEMCON)
REF: CAIRO 12619

ASSISTANT SECRETARY MAYNES HAS CLEARED THE REPORT OF HIS
CONSULTATIONS WITH DIRECTOR MFA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
DEPT. AMRE MOUSSA AS FOLLOWS:

1. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MAYNES MET WITH MFA DIRECTOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPT. AMRE MOUSSA JULY 20. MAYNES STRESSED CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S DEDICATION TO UN SYSTEM AND TO CONVICTION THAT UN ENTERING INTO NEW PHASE IN WHICH IT ESSENTIAL THAT WE HAVE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY MEM-
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 182728

BERS WELL IN ADVANCE OF ACTUAL MEETINGS. EGYPT IS ONE OF THESE KEY STATES AND, ALTHOUGH OUR VIEWS ARE NOT ALWAYS IDENTICAL, US WANTS TO UNDERSTAND EGYPTIAN POINT OF VIEW.

2. MOUSSA WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSIONS ON WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES, STATING THAT USG AND GOE SEE EYE-TO-EYE ON MANY ISSUES. HE SUGGESTED THAT DISCUSSIONS BEGIN ON POLITICAL ISSUES WHICH ARE OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST TO US.

3. SOUTHERN AFRICA. MAYNES SAID THAT ADMINISTRATION HAS

DECIDED TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES MORE ACTIVELY AND REFERRED TO INITIATIVES OF FIVE WESTERN MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL ON NAMIBIA. US IS CAUTIOUSLY PLEASED WITH RESULTS THUS FAR, BUT MAJOR PROBLEM IS NOW TO GET SWAPO TO NEW YORK TO MEET WITH CONTACT GROUP, UN SECRETARIAT AND KEY AFRICAN COUNTRIES. SOUTH AFRICA HAS MADE SOME CONCESSIONS, BUT MORE WILL BE NEEDED (MOUSSA AGREED WITH THE LATTER PART OF THAT STATEMENT). THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN, HOWEVER, UNLESS SWAPO ENTERS THE EXERCISE SERIOUSLY. MAYNES SAID IF FURTHER MOVEMENT DOES NOT TAKE PLACE, SOUTH AFRICAN LIKELY TO GO AHEAD WITH ITS OWN INTERNAL SOLUTION. US IS ALSO URGING UN SECRETARIAT TO DO SOME CONTINGENCY PLANNING BECAUSE THE UN WILL HAVE MAJOR ROLE TO PLAY. SECRETARIAT, HOWEVER, IS RELUCTANT TO MOVE UNTIL AFRICANS URGE THEM TO IF PROBLEM NOT DEALT WITH URGENTLY, SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT REFUSE AFRICAN PROPOSALS.

4. MOUSSA SAID GOE APPRECIATED US CONCERN AND ATTENTION TOWARD NAMIBIA AND BELIEVED THAT WESTERN INITIATIVE HAD OPENED THE WAY FOR A SETTLEMENT. HE SAID INITIATIVE WIDELY APPRECIATED BY AFRICANS AT THE LIBREVILLE MEETING AND THAT WE WOULD HAVE NO CONFRONTATION ON THIS ISSUE AT GA. HOWEVER, SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE WITH REGARD TO ELECTIONS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 182728

WAS STILL NOT SATISFACTORY TO THE AFRICANS. HE AGREED THAT NEXT STEP WOULD BE FOR THE AFRICANS TO MAKE THEIR OWN PROPOSALS SINCE MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE. FOR ITS OWN PART, THE GOE SEES MANY POSITIVE POINTS IN THE WESTERN INITIATIVE BUT IT MUST CONSULT WITH THE OAU AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES (NAC) BECAUSE IT CANNOT SELL ANYTHING UNLESS THERE ARE TANGIBLE RESULTS FOR AFRICA. MAYNES AGREED THAT IT WAS REASONABLE TO EXPECT TANGIBLE RESULTS AND WE BELIEVED WE HAD ALREADY ACHIEVED SOME. IN PARTICULAR, THROUGH OUR INITIATIVE, SOUTH AFRICA HAD ABANDONED TURNHALLE CONFERENCE. NOW ISSUE WAS TO INVOLVE SWAPO MORE INTIMATELY IN THE PROCESS OF PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF ITS PROBLEM.

5. WITH REGARD TO SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF, MAYNES ADDED, US HAS ADOPTED NEW POLICY AS ENUNCIATED IN VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN VIENNA. THE ESSENCE OF THIS POLICY WAS TO URGE PROGRESS ON ALL THREE SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES -- NAMIBIA, RHODESIA, AND APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF. WITH REGARD TO SOUTH AFRICA, THE US BELIEVES THERE MUST BE PROGRESS ON FULL PARTICIPATION OF ALL CITIZENS IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY. MAYNES POINTED OUT

THAT SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT LEADERS HAD DELIBERATELY DISTORTED WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD SAID IN VIENNA.

MAYNES SAID THAT THE US WOULD PARTICIPATE

IN THE AUGUST LAGOS CONFERENCE AGAINST APARTHEID. MOUSSA ASKED WHAT PROSPECTS WE SAW FOR SOUTH AFRICA ABANDONING APARTHEID AND HOW FAR THE US WAS PREPARED TO GO IN PUSHING THIS. MAYNES POINTED OUT THAT OUR OWN POLICY IN THIS REGARD WAS STATED CLEARLY IN THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PRESS STATEMENT. IN HIS OPINION, THERE WAS ALREADY AN UNPRECEDENTED INTERNAL DEBATE GOING ON IN SOUTH AFRICA BUT HE BELIEVED THIS WAS LESS THE RESULT OF ANY CHANGE IN WEST POLICY OR THE POLICY OF OTHER OUTSIDE POWERS BUT RATHER THE CONSE-

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 182728

QUENCE OF NEW POLITICAL FORCES WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF PARTICULARLY IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY. HE BELIEVED THAT CHANGE WOULD BASICALLY HAVE TO COME FROM INSIDE RATHER THAN OUTSIDE. MOUSSA ASSERTED THAT ONLY OUTSIDE FORCE WOULD BRING A SOLUTION.

6. ZIMBABWE. MOUSSA SAID APARTHEID WAS PRIORITY PROBLEM BUT NAMIBIA AND ZIMBABWE, PARTICULARLY THE LATTER, WERE MORE URGENT. THE OAU, SUPPORTING THE FRONT LINE STATE, BELIEVES IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO RESOLVE ZIMBABWE PROBLEM BY NEGOTIATIONS AND ON THIS ISSUE IN CONTRAST TO NAMIBIA, US MIGHT FIND ITSELF CHALLENGED BY AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY. MAYNES CONCEDED THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAD BEEN ENCOUNTERED WITH RESPECT TO ZIMBABWE BUT THE ALTERNATIVE TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT MAY BE A CIVIL WAR AND EVERYONE WANTS TO FIND SOME WAY TO AVOID THIS. MOUSSA CONCEDED THAT IT IS A VERY EXPLOSIVE SITUATION. MAYNES NOTED THAT THE KEY STUMBLING BLOCK NOW IS THE QUESTION OF A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. HE ASKED IF THE GOE COULD ENVISAGE AN OUTSIDE PEACEKEEPING FORCE DURING A TRANSITION PERIOD LEADING TO MAJORITY RULE. MOUSSA THOUGHT THAT SUCH A FORCE TO KEEP LAW AND ORDER DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE OAU. MAYNES ASKED WHERE THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE WOULD COME FROM -- THE COMMONWEALTH OR THE UN .- SINCE ANY FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES. MOUSSA THOUGHT THAT THE OAU WOULD AGREE TO A BRITISH FORCE. MAYNES POINTED OUT THAT THE BRITISH DO NOT WANT TO CONTRIBUTE TO A COMMONWEALTH FORCE. MOUSSA SAID THAT AN ALL AFRICAN FORCE WOULD BE THE OAU'S SECOND CHOICE BUT HE HIMSELF HAD NOTED THAT IT WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE WHITES. IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE HE THOUGHT THAT THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE SHOULD BE BRITISH, COMMONWEALTH, ALL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 182728

AFRICAN OR FROM THE UN.

7. ZIONISM/RACISM. MAYNES SAID US HOPED TO AVOID ZIONISM/RACISM ISSUE AT THE ANTI-APARTHEID CONFERENCE IN LAGOS

SINCE IT IS NOT THE KIND OF ISSUE WHICH HELPS US TO PLAY A ROLE CONSTRUCTIVELY EITHER WITH ISRAEL OR IN AFRICA. MOUSSA SAID THE US IS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ANY ATTACK ON ZIONISM AND SHOULD NOT RESPOND TO THIS ISSUE. IN ANY CASE, HE CONTENDED EGYPT WOULD NOT PUSH ZIONISM-RACISM ISSUE, BUT HE DID NOT SEE WHY US HAD TO CONCERN ITSELF WITH IT. MAYNES REITERATED THAT THE ISSUE IS DESTRUCTIVE OF US ABILITY TO PUSH PEACE EFFORTS. HE SAID IT IS A "CODE WORD" WHICH MOBILIZES THE ENTIRE US LIBERAL CONSTITUENCY -- - - - AND CREATES AN ATMOSPHERE WHICH MAKES IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST ISSUES DISPASSIONATELY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IT IS NOT JUST THE JEWISH COMMUNITY WHICH IS AROUSED BY THIS ISSUE, BUT A MAJORITY OF AMERICANS. HE SAID THAT IF ZIONISM/RACISM WERE INSERTED INTO THE FINAL RESOLUTION AT LAGOS THIS WOULD BE A PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE DEVELOPMENT BUT HE WOULD COUNSEL EVEN AGAINST STATEMENTS ON THIS ISSUE DURING THE CONFERENCE SINCE PRESS COULD MISINTERPRET THESE. MAYNES CONCLUDED BY STRESSING THAT THE LAGOS CONFERENCE IS A CONFERENCE AGAINST APARTHEID AND THEREFORE REFERENCES TO ZIONISM/RACISM WERE INAPPROPRIATE. MOUSSA AGREED THAT LAGOS ANTI-APARTHEID CONFERENCE IS SEPARATE FROM THE DECLARATION AGAINST RACISM. HE ASSERTED THAT THE GOE MUST SPEAK OUT AGAINST RACISM EVERYWHERE INCLUDING ANY FOUND IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BUT IS PREPARED TO AGREE ON A COMPROMISE IN THIS CASE. GOE WOULD NOT PUSH TO MAKE ZIONISM/RACISM A CENTRAL ISSUE. IT WILL, HOWEVER, BE MENTIONED AND THERE WILL BE MOVES TO GET RESOLUTIONS OR DECLARATIONS. THEREFORE, THE US MUST SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY. MAYNES AGREED THAT SOME GOVERNMENTS WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE. THIS FACT DID NOT MAKE IT ANY LESS TRUE THAT EITHER A RESOLUTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 182728

TION OR A RHETORICAL CAMPAIGN WITHIN THE CONFERENCE ON THIS ISSUE WOULD HAVE A VERY DAMAGING PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFECT. MOUSSA CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION BY STATING THAT THE GOE WOULD NOT PUSH THE ZIONISM/RACISM ISSUE AND THAT IF OTHER DELEGATIONS TRIED, THE GOE WOULD ATTEMPT TO "CALM THINGS DOWN."

8. HUMAN RIGHTS. MOUSSA ASKED WHAT THE US POSITION WOULD BE AT THE 32ND UNGA ON HUMAN RIGHTS. WOULD US WISH TO FOLLOW UP ITS POSITION IN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN SUPPORT OF DISSIDENTS IN SOVIET UNION? MAYNES RESPONDED THAT THE US WOULD GIVE MAJOR EMPHASIS TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN GA BUT WAS NOT GOING TO ATTACK ANY ONE COUNTRY. HE FELT THAT SOME PROGRESS SHOULD BE MADE ON THE TORTURE ISSUE. US WOULD CONTINUE TO GIVE THIS QUESTION PRIORITY AS IT HAD IN AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S SPEECH BEFORE ECOSOC IN THE SPRING. ONE WAY TO DO THIS MIGHT BE TO SET UP A COMMISSION TO DEAL WITH TORTURE IMPARTIALLY THROUGH AN ESTABLISHED MECHANISM. MOUSSA QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS APPROACH COULD

BE EFFECTIVE AND ASKED IF CREATION OF A NEW COMMISSION WAS NOT CONTRIDICTORY TO AMERICANS TO THE US POSITION ON STRUCTURAL REFORM WHICH OPPOSED NEW BODIES. MAYNES POINTED OUT THAT THE US POSITION ON STRUCTURAL REFORM HAD ALWAYS CALLED FOR UPGRADING THE UN'S ATTENTION TO HUMAN RIGHTS. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM MOUSSA, MAYNES CONFIRMED THAT US CONTINUED TO SUPPORT PRESIDENT CARTER'S SUGGESTION THAT HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SHOULD MEET MORE THAN ONCE A YEAR IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE CURRENT WORKLOAD. MOUSSA REPLIED THAT IF MEETINGS OF THE GA AND ECOSOC WERE INCLUDED, THERE ALREADY FOUR MEETINGS A YEAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS. HE DID NOT SEE THE NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL MEETING OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION UNLESS IT HAD A SPECIFIC MANDATE. MAYNES REPEATED THAT ONE FUNCTION WOULD SIMPLY BE TO FINISH THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 182728

AGENDA. HE ALSO NOTED THE UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION WE NOW FACE WHERE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLAINT MAY HAVE TO WAIT AN ENTIRE YEAR BEFORE IT CAN BE ADDRESSED BY THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.

MAYNES CONFIRMED THAT THE US CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE COSTA RICAN PROPOSAL TO CREATE A HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. MOUSSA INTERJECTED THAT THE GOE ALSO FAVORS THIS "OLD IDEA" BUT EGYPT'S POSITION WAS THAT THE NAC MUST APPROVE IT. MAYNES ASKED WHETHER THE NAC WAS LIKELY TO AGREE WITH THE PROPOSAL IF THE FIRST HIGH COMMISSIONER WERE TO COME FROM A NAC COUNTRY. MOUSSA THOUGHT THAT IF THE SUBJECT WERE APPROACHED IN AN OBJECTIVE WAY NOT IN TERMS OF US-USSR CONFRONTATION, THERE WOULD BE A POSSIBILITY. HE CAUTIONED HOWEVER THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD "RAISE HELL" WITH THE NAC COUNTRIES WERE THEY TO ENDORSE THE HIGH COMMISSIONER PROPOSAL. IN PRINCIPLE, THE GOE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE PROPOSAL; HOWEVER, MOUSSA SAID THAT IF THE GOE DECIDED THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSAL WAS TO SUPPORT THE IMMIGRATION OF JEWS FROM THE SOVIET UNION, IT COULD NOT BE ACTIVE IN ITS SUPPORT BECAUSE THESE JEWS THEN RETURNED TO ISRAEL AND CREATED A SECURITY PROBLEM FOR THE GOE. MAYNES POINTED OUT THAT MOST OF THE JEWISH IMMIGRANTS

FROM THE SOVIET UNION WENT TO THE UNITED STATES. MOUSSA SMILED AND REPLIED THAT THEY ONLY MADE MONEY IN THE US AND SENT IT TO ISRAEL.

MOUSSA ASSERTED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE US WAS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN ONLY ONE SUBJECT -- SOVIET JEWRY. THIS ALSO EXPLAINED US GOVERNMENT INTEREST IN THIS SUBJECT. MAYNES STRONGLY DISAGREED NOTING THAT DEEP SUPPORT IN THE US FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WAS ROOTED IN MORE THAN GENUINE CONCERN FOR THE PLIGHT OF SOVIET JEWS. HIS OPINION WAS THAT IT RESULTED FROM A NUMBER OF FACTORS INCLUDING THE NATIONAL REACTION TO THE VIETNAM WAR. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 182728

WANTED A FOREIGN POLICY IN WHICH THEY COULD TAKE PRIDE AND THIS EXPLAINED THE STRONG AND POSITIVE RESPONSE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO THE PRESIDENT'S INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT. MOUSSA REITERATED THAT THE GOE CANNOT HELP AT ALL IN PROMOTING THE PRESIDENT'S INTEREST IN THIS SUBJECT TO THE EXTENT THAT SOVIET JEWRY BECOMES THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

9. MIDDLE EAST QUESTIONS. MOUSSA SAID HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES ARE RELATED TO MIDDLE EAST QUESTIONS BECAUSE ISRAELI POLICY IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF ESTABLISHING SETTLEMENTS AND EXPELLING PALESTINIANS VIOLATED BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS. MOUSSA CONTENDED THAT THE US RECORD ON THESE QUESTIONS OVERWHELMINGLY AGAINST A SOUND POLICY OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE ONLY EXCEPTION HAS BEEN THE US POSITION FAVORING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS IN NOVEMBER 1976 ON SETTLEMENTS. MAYNES SAID HE ASSUMED MOUSSA WAS REFERRING TO AMBASSADOR SCRANTON'S STATEMENT IN NOVEMBER 1976. MOUSSA IMMEDIATELY ASKED IF BY IDENTIFYING THAT STATEMENT AS SCRANTON'S, MAYNES MEANT TO IMPLY THAT SCRANTON'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE WAS EMBRACED ONLY BY THE LAST ADMINISTRATION. MAYNES SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE US POSITION ON SETTLEMENTS WHICH WE STRONGLY DISAPPROVED OF. IN THAT CASE MOUSSA SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY US HAD DISAPPROVED IN THE GA A SETTLEMENTS RESOLUTION WHICH

IT APPROVED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. MAYNES POINTED OUT THAT THE GOE HAD CLEVERLY CHANGED A FEW WORDS OF THE RESOLUTION IN THE GA VERSION TO INCREASE ITS SCOPE. HE ALSO NOTED GENERAL US POLICY TO DISAPPROVE EFFORTS BY THE GA TO REINTERPRET RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. MOUSSA SAID THAT HE DID NOT AGREE WITH THIS APPROACH AND TURNED

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 182728

TO THE ISSUE OF THE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, WHOSE WORK HE SAID THE US KNEW WAS BASED ON EVIDENCE THAT WAS ACCURATE. MAYNES SAID THAT THE US COULD NOT COOPERATE WITH THE PALESTINIAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE BECAUSE ITS MANDATE WAS

FRAMED IN A MANNER PREJUDICIAL TO ISRAEL. RETURNING TO THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE, MOUSSA SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE GOE HAVE US SUPPORT. EGYPT WANTS A SOLID CALL FROM UN MEMBERS INCLUDING THE US AGAINST ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY. MAYNES SAID THAT THE US WAS OPPOSED TO ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE NEXT GA WOULD HAVE A VERY CRITICAL IMPACT ON NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. MOUSSA REPLIED THAT IF

RAISING SUBJECT IN THE GA WOULD HAVE A DETRIMENTAL IMPACT ON NEGOTIATIONS, THEN THE US MUST EXERT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO STOP POLICIES SUCH AS FURTHER SETTLEMENTS WHICH MAKE IT NECESSARY TO RAISE SUCH QUESTIONS IN THE UN FORA.

10. DISARMAMENT. MAYNES SAID PRESIDENT CARTER HAS DECIDED THAT COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT) HAS HIGHEST PRIORITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE DISARMAMENT FIELD. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IS ANOTHER ISSUE OF GREAT PRIORITY. HE EXPECTED THE DISARMAMENT DEBATE TO TAKE LESS TIME IN UNGA THIS YEAR BECAUSE OF THE UPCOMING SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD). HE INFORMED MOUSSA THAT THE US IS TAKING A POSITIVE STANCE ON SSOD AND IN GENERAL HAS BEEN PLEASED WITH THE BUSINESS-LIKE APPROACH OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE. MOUSSA REPLIED THAT SSOD IS A NAC IDEA AND THEREFORE THE GOE IS COMMITTED TO IT. HOWEVER, HE SUGGESTED THAT SSOD WOULD BE A FAILURE IF IT TURNED OUT ONLY TO INVOLVE A GENERAL DEBATE AND RESOLUTIONS. IN THE VIEW OF EGYPT, THE SSOD SHOULD DISCUSS A LARGE NUMBER OF ITEMS AND LAY OUT A PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR THE NEXT FOUR OR FIVE YEARS. HE PERSONALLY, HOWEVER, IS DOUBTFUL THAT MUCH WILL COME OF SSOD. MAYNES AGREED THAT IF SSOD ONLY TAKES THE FORM OF ANOTHER GA DEBATE IT WILL BE A FAILURE.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 182728

ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WILL BE THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND MOST THOROUGH DISARMAMENT MEETING TO TAKE PLACE IN THE POST-WAR ERA. AS A RESULT THE US SEES IT AS A UNIQUE MEETING AND IS UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF THE ENTIRE RANGE OF DISARMAMENT ISSUES INCLUDING POSSIBLE CHANGES IN MACHINERY. MAYNES NOTED THAT THE US SEES SSOD AS PROVIDING A STIMULUS FOR ACTION IN OTHER BODIES. TO BE SUCCESSFUL, HE BELIEVES THAT SSOD SHOULD NOT LIMIT ITSELF TO EXAMINATION OF DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS SOLELY INVOLVING THE US AND THE USSR. RATHER, IT SHOULD PROVIDE A STIMULUS TO DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT INCLUDING DISCUSSIONS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY INVOLVING THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. MOUSSA REPLIED THAT THE KEY ISSUE STILL INVOLVED THE US AND THE USSR. HE NOTED THAT THE TONE OF SSOD WOULD DEPEND TO A SIGNIFICANT EXTENT ON WHETHER

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WERE ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS ON KEY DISARMAMENT ISSUES LIKE THE CTB PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL OPENING OF SSOD. (MOUSSA'S COLLEAGUES SUBSEQUENTLY MADE CLEAR EGYPT'S OPPOSITION TO REGIONAL DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS INVOLVING THE MIDDLE EAST UNTIL THERE IS A FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT.

11. NPT. MOUSSA SAID THE GOE WANTS ALL COUNTRIES TO ADHERE TO THE NPT. OTHERWISE HE DOUBTED THAT THERE COULD BE ANY PROGRESS IN REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, FOR EXAMPLE, ISRAEL REFUSES TO SIGN THE NPT, AND FOR

THAT REASON THE GOE HAS SIGNED IT BUT NOT RATIFIED IT.
MOUSSA NOTED THAT EGYPT HAS PROPOSED WITH IRAN A NUCLEAR
FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT AGAIN THE PROBLEM IS
ISRAELI OPPOSITION. HE URGED THE UNITED STATES TO PRESS
FOR UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE INCLUDING ISRAELI ADHERENCE TO THE
NPT. MOUSSA SAID THE GOE ALSO FAVORED REDUCTION IN MILITARY
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 11 STATE 182728

TARY BUDGETS BUT THAT TO AVOID RHETORICAL EXERCISES IN
FUTILITY, THE UN SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON AREAS WHERE PROGRESS
CAN BE MADE.

12. PNE'S. IN RESPONSE TO MOUSSA'S QUERY, MAYNES SAID
THAT THE US BELIEVED THAT A CTB MUST INCLUDE A BAN ON
PNE'S (PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS). MOUSSA SAID THAT
THE GOE IS CONSIDERING USE OF PNE'S FOR THE QATTARA
DEPRESSION PROJECT. HE DOUBTED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD
AGREE TO INCLUDE PNE'S IN THE CTB. MAYNES REPLIED THAT
US STUDIES HAVE SHOWN THAT PNE'S ARE NOT ECONOMICAL AND
WE DOUBT THAT THE USSR CAN FIND ECONOMICAL USES FOR
THEM DESPITE THE SOVIETS' GRANDIOSE IDEAS FOR DIVERSION
OF MAJOR RIVERS FROM THE ARTIC OCEAN INTO THE CASPIAN
SEA. SUCH PROJECTS ALSO COULD HAVE MAJOR AND NEGATIVE
CLIMATIC IMPLICATIONS. MAYNES CONCLUDED BY STRESSING
THAT A FURTHER PROBLEM WITH PNE'S WAS THAT WE HAVE NO
MEANS TO DETERMINE WHEN AND IF PNE'S ARE BEING USED FOR
WEAPON DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES.

13. CCD. MOUSSA SAID THE GOE WISHED TO REACTIVATE THE
ROLE OF THE NON-ALIGNED IN THE CCD, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED
AS RUBBER STAMP FOR THE US AND THE USSR. MAYNES SAID
IT WAS CLEAR FROM DISCUSSIONS HE HAD HAD WITH TOP ACDA
OFFICIALS THAT THEY CONSIDER THE CCD TO BE A REAL
NEGOTIATING FORUM. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY BELIEVED THAT
DECISIVE ASPECTS OF THE CTB AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION WOULD BE DISCUSSED AND DETERMINED BY THE
CCD. WE RECOGNIZE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES DID HAVE AN
IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY ON THESE SIGNIFICANT DISARMAMENT
ISSUES. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT ONE OF THE PROBLEMS
OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES IN THE CCD IS THAT THEY OFTEN
DO NOT DEVOTE SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO THE EFFORT. HE

NOTED GARCIA ROBLES, ONE OF THE MOST DEDICATED DISARMAMENT EXPERTS IN THE UN SYSTEM, HAD COMPLAINED BITTERLY
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 12 STATE 182728

THAT MANY THIRD WORLD MEMBERS OF THE CCD DID NOT EVEN
TAKE THE STEP OF APPOINTING A FULL-TIME PERSON TO WORK
ON THE SUBJECT IN GENEVA. MOUSSA NOTED THAT SEVERAL
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES NEVERTHELESS DID MAKE A MAJOR

COMMITMENT IN RESOURCES TO THIS WORK AND THEY STILL FELT THAT THE SUPERPOWERS IGNORED THEIR SUGGESTIONS. MAYNES STRESSED AGAIN THAT TOP ACDA OFFICIALS DO SEE POSSIBILITIES FOR PROGRESS ON THE CTB AND THE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THAT THE CCD WILL BE AN IMPORTANT BODY IN ACHIEVING A FINAL SOLUTION.

14. UN STRUCTURE. MAYNES SAID THAT THE US WANTS TO OPEN UP A DIALOGUE WITH UN MEMBERS TO ENSURE THAT CONTRIBUTIONS AND RESOURCES OF THE UN SYSTEM ARE USED MORE EFFECTIVELY. THIS IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO ATTRACT SUPPORT FOR THE EXISTING SYSTEM AND TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR INCREASED CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE FUTURE. IN THIS CONNECTION, MAYNES SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD LIKE (1) MORE RIGOROUS EVALUATION OF THE OUTPUTS OF UN PROGRAMS RATHER THAN SIMPLE AUDITS OF THE INPUTS; (2) ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE SECRETARIATS IN THE UN SYSTEM TO DEVELOP COMMON PROCEDURES ON BUDGETS SO THAT THERE CAN BE A CLEAR AND INTERNALLY CONSISTENT WAY OF DETERMINING WHERE THE MONEY IS GOING; AND (3) IDENTIFICATION OF THE TEN PERCENT HIGHEST PRIORITY PROJECTS AND THE TEN LOWWEST -PRIORITY PROJECTS IN ALL UNBUDGETS, THEREBY PROVIDING UN MEMBERS WITH TOOLS TO MAKE JUDGMENTS FOR THE APPLICATION OF FUNDS. MAYNES SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE EXAMINING THESE PROPOSALS WITH OTHER MEMBERS IN THE FUTURE IN AN EFFORT TO BUILD CONSENSUS ON THIS. MOUSSA AGREED THAT THERE WAS A COMMON INTEREST BETWEEN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES ON THESE QUESTIONS. HE SUGGESTED MAYNES DISCUSS THE ISSUE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 13 STATE 182728

FURTHER WITH THE HEAD OF THE ECONOMIC DEPARTMENT, HUSNI.

15. COMMENT. ALTHOUGH THE US AND EGYPTIAN POSITIONS ON MANY OF THE ISSUES DISCUSSED WERE NOT IDENTICAL, MOUSSA AND OTHER EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS SEEMED TO APPRECIATE GREATLY THE GESTURE MADE BY THE US GOVERNMENT IN INITIATING THIS PRE-GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISCUSSION OF UN SUBJECTS. CHRISTOPHER

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